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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 26.1 
 
 The amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is a 
non-profit organization with no parent corporation.  No public corporation owns 
any part of the ACLJ, and the ACLJ issues no stock. 
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I.   IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
 The amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is an 
organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law.  
ACLJ attorneys have argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and 
other federal and state courts in numerous cases involving constitutional issues.  
E.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384 (1993).  ACLJ attorneys also have participated as amicus curiae in 
numerous cases involving constitutional issues before the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts. 
 The ACLJ has been active in the litigation concerning the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(“PPACA”).  The ACLJ filed amici curiae briefs on behalf of itself, Members of 
Congress, and the Constitutional Committee to Challenge the President and 
Congress on Health Care in Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-188-HEH (E.D. Va. 2010), and State of 
Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-
RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. 2010), two other cases challenging the constitutionality of the 
PPACA’s individual mandate.   
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 Also, the ACLJ represents the plaintiffs in Mead v. Holder, No. 1:10-cv-
00950 (D.D.C. 2010), another case challenging the individual mandate’s 
constitutionality on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce.  The ACLJ, thus, has an interest that may be affected by the 
instant case in that any decision by this court would be persuasive authority in 
Mead. 
 In short, the ACLJ has developed an expertise in the area of the law involved 
in this case.  Its expertise will benefit this court in deciding this case.  The proper 
resolution of this case is a matter of substantial concern to the ACLJ and to its 
clients in Mead. 
II.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate economic activity, 
not economic decisions.  As such, the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
Congress to regulate the inactivity of American citizens by requiring them to buy a 
good or service (such as health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence 
in this country.  Because the individual mandate provision of the PPACA requires 
citizens to purchase health insurance or be penalized, the PPACA exceeds 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. 
 Although an earlier version of the health care legislation contained a 
severability clause, the PPACA does not, and the PPACA’s remaining provisions 
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cannot function without the individual mandate.  These two factors lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that Congress would not have passed the PPACA without the 
individual mandate.  Consequently, because the individual mandate provision is 
unconstitutional and not severable from the remainder of the PPACA, the entire 
PPACA must be held invalid. 
III.   ARGUMENT 
 
A.   SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY 
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
 The Supreme Court has noted that  
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, “the 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite.”  
 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45, 
pp. 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).   
1.   Section 1501 is not authorized by the Commerce Clause 
 
 Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes.”  Although the scope of this power has been broadened from the 
original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by which commerce is to 
be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), the Supreme 
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Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion and exercise of this power is 
not unlimited. 
 A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section 
1501 of the PPACA exceeds the outer bounds of Congressional power and 
underscores that the district court’s decision upholding the PPACA under the 
Commerce Clause was wrong. 
 In particular, the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
“regulate” inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service (such as 
health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence in the United States, nor 
does it ignore the line between abstract decision-making and concrete economic or 
commercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.  In addition, the 
Commerce Clause does not license Congress to force new participants into a 
market in order to benefit existing, willing market participants, nor does it give 
Congress carte blanche to include unconstitutional provisions within a larger 
scheme of regulation of commercial activity. 
a.   Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
 
 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld 
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be 
imposed on the plaintiff for growing more wheat than the marketing quota set for 
his farm.  The Act limited wheat production to limit supply and stabilize market 
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prices.  Id. at 115-16.  The plaintiff grew more than twice the quota for his farm; he 
typically sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion for feeding 
his livestock and home consumption, and kept the rest for future use.  Id. at 114-
15.  He argued that the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because 
the activities regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 119.  The Court upheld the Act, stating “even if appellee’s 
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 125. 
 The Court reviewed a summary of the economics of the wheat industry, 
which outlined the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in 
local communities, the United States, and the world, id. at 125-28, and observed 
that “[t]he effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount [of wheat] which 
may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall 
resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs.”  Id. at 127 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, the penalty targeted farmers who, like the plaintiff, grew 
far more wheat than the amount needed to fill their own demand in order to sell 
most of the excess in the market.  
 As such, Wickard does not stand for the proposition that Congress may 
regulate non-economic activity, or inactivity, that may have some relationship to 
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interstate commerce so long as it is related to a “broad scheme[] regulating 
interstate commerce,” as the district court here wrongly concluded.  (R. 28, Order 
at 13.)  Rather, the Court held that Congress may regulate purely local economic 
activity (growing a marketable commodity that may be sold in the market or 
consumed by the grower) when that economic activity, taken in the aggregate, is 
directly tied to and substantially effects interstate commerce. 
 Wickard provides no support for Section 1501.  The statute in Wickard 
targeted a specific economic activity—the over-production of wheat, the excess of 
which was often sold in the market—which substantially affected prices in the 
interstate market for that commodity.  Congress could not have dealt with the issue 
of low wheat prices by declaring that all Americans must buy a specific amount of 
wheat or pay a penalty for failing to do so.  An individual’s decision to not buy a 
specific amount of wheat, when viewed in the aggregate, would certainly have 
impacted overall demand for wheat as well as wheat prices, yet the power “[t]o 
regulate commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, would not 
authorize a mandate that individuals who do not want to buy wheat must do so.  
Similarly, Wickard provides no support for Section 1501’s mandate that 
individuals who do not want to engage in a commercial transaction (purchasing 
health insurance) must do so or suffer a penalty, and, thus, does not support the 
district court’s incorrect conclusion that Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
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extends to regulating economic decisions rather than economic activities.  (See R. 
28, Order at 17-19); Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *38 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010) (rejecting the 
government’s expansive interpretation of “activity” as lacking logical limitation or 
support from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.) 
b.   United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
 
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), illustrates that Section 1501 
exceeds Congress’s authority.  In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun Free School 
Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a 
school, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it had “nothing 
to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one 
might define those terms.”  Id. at 561.  The Court discussed Gibbons v. Ogden—
the Court’s first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which stated, 
“‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse.  
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.’”  Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90).  The Gibbons 
Court observed that the power to “regulate” commerce is the power to “‘prescribe 
the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted that “‘[t]he enumeration 
[of the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting Gibbons, 22 
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U.S. at 194-95, 196); see also id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that 
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause was much more limited than 
the Court’s modern interpretation). 
 The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause “‘must be 
considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended 
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.’”  Id. at 557 (citation omitted).  The Court identified three 
“categories of activity” that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes 
the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). 
 The Court summarized cases dealing with the third category of activity as 
holding that, “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, 
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 560 (emphasis added).  
The Act exceeded Congress’s authority because gun possession was not economic 
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activity, nor was the Act  
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated.  It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases 
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected 
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 561.  The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows thoroughly new 
ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal 
firearms legislation.’”  Id. at 563 (citation omitted). 
 The government argued that the Court should focus on whether, through a 
chain of inferences, possession of guns in a school zone may, in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce, rather than focusing on whether the 
statute targeted economic activity.  For example, the government cited the cost-
shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that gun possession may lead to 
violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the 
mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population.”  Id. at 
563-64.  In rejecting these arguments, the Court responded by stating: 
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s arguments.  
The Government admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that 
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that 
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to 
interstate commerce. . . .  Similarly, under the Government’s “national 
productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it 
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: 
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for 
example.  Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 
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§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even 
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The Court noted, in rejecting the government’s unduly expansive view of 
congressional power, that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary 
police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” id. at 
566, and stated, 
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States. . . .  To [expand the scope of 
the Commerce Clause] would require us to conclude that the 
Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something 
not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to 
do. 
 
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting the importance of federalism principles in interpreting the scope of the 
Commerce Clause). 
 Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez.  Being lawfully 
present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet of a 
school, is not a commercial or economic activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  The cases Lopez relied upon referred to ongoing commercial or 
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economic activities that Congress may regulate,1/ and provide no support for the 
assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed’” includes the power to force those who do not want to engage in a 
commercial or economic activity to do so.  See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 196).  As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States.”  Id. at 567.  
 A review of Section 1501’s findings illustrates that Congress’s assertion of 
Commerce Clause power is unprecedented in its reach.  First and foremost, 
Congress sought to obscure entirely the distinction between inactivity and 
economic activity, stating “[t]he requirement regulates activity that is commercial 
and economic in nature:  economic and financial decisions about how and when 
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”  PPACA § 
1501(a)(2)(A), as amended by § 10106(a) (emphasis added).  In other words, 
Congress asserted that being lawfully present in the United States without health 
insurance is the economic activity of deciding to not buy health insurance; as such, 
Congress may “regulate” that economic activity by requiring individuals to make a 
                                                 
 
1/ See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
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different economic decision, that is, to buy health insurance.  Under this reasoning, 
virtually any decision to not buy a good or service would be “economic activity” 
that can be targeted by a law requiring individuals to buy that good or service. 
 The district court wrongly concluded that inaction and economic action are 
no different for Commerce Clause purposes.  (See R. 28, Order at 17-19.)  The 
district court’s conclusion is fundamentally flawed because it equates abstract 
economic decision-making with concrete economic activity.  Most American adults 
make numerous choices on a daily basis concerning when and whether to spend 
money on an array of goods and services.  A person may choose to buy X and 
choose not to buy Y.  Under Congress’s reasoning, so long as Congress has the 
authority to regulate the interstate market for Y (which is often the case), it can 
mandate that all individuals take part in the market for Y as consumers.  Congress 
would merely need to assert that decisions about whether to purchase Y are 
commercial and economic in nature, and that individuals’ decisions to not buy Y 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
 In addition, Congress stated that “[t]he economy loses up to 
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the 
uninsured,” and Section 1501 would “significantly reduce this economic cost.”  
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(E), as amended by § 10106(a).  If the economic impact of 
Americans’ poorer health and shorter lifespans provided a sufficient basis for 
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Congress to mandate that individuals buy health insurance, then Congress could 
also mandate that individuals take other actions that Congress deems necessary to 
improve health and lengthen life expectancies—such as requiring Americans to 
buy a gym membership, maintain a specific body weight, or eat a healthier diet—
or pay penalties for failing to do so.  
 Congress also alleged that Section 1501 would lower the cost of health 
insurance premiums because “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the 
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008,” which was passed on to private insurers 
and individuals who have private insurance.  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended 
by § 10106(a).  The government made a virtually identical cost-shifting argument 
in Lopez,2/ but the Supreme Court held that Congress can only reach “economic 
activity” that substantially affects interstate commerce; neither gun possession nor 
lawful presence in the United States is economic activity. 
 Moreover, Congress declared that requiring individuals to buy health 
insurance will benefit those who participate in the health insurance market by 
“increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care services,” “reduc[ing] 
administrative costs and lower[ing] health insurance premiums,” “broaden[ing] the 
                                                 
 
2/ The government stated in its merits brief in Lopez, “[t]he economic 
consequences of criminal behavior are substantial . . . and, through the mechanism 
of insurance, spread throughout the population.”  Brief of the United States, at *28, 
n.9, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260), 1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted). 
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health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals,” and “creating effective 
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be 
sold.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C), (I), (J), as amended by § 10106(a).  The 
Commerce Clause has never been understood, however, to allow Congress to force 
unwilling buyers into a market to remedy perceived market shortcomings, and 
Congress has never previously tried to do so.  As Judge Henry Hudson noted in a 
case involving the PPACA, Section 1501 “literally forges new ground and extends 
Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high water mark.”  Commonwealth of 
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
Judge Roger Vinson agreed with this point in another challenge to the PPACA, in 
which he wrote, based on the pertinent Commerce Clause and Necessary and 
Proper Clause cases, that the “power that the individual mandate seeks to harness 
is simply without prior precedent.”3/  State of Florida v. United States Dep’t of 
                                                 
 
3/ Judge Vinson properly distinguished Wickard and Heart of Atlanta Motel 
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), cases the district court relied on here, by 
explaining that those cases   
 
involved activities in which the plaintiffs had chosen to engage.  All 
Congress was doing was saying that if you choose to engage in the 
activity of operating a motel or growing wheat, you are engaging in 
interstate commerce and subject to federal authority. 
 
But, in this case we are dealing with something very different.  The 
individual mandate applies across the board.  People have no choice 
                             (Text of footnote continues on the following page.) 
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Health & Human Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *114 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 
14, 2010). 
 There have been many times throughout American history when changing 
market conditions was a desirable goal, yet 
never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that 
an individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private 
company.  Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers” is 
one thing; making everyone buy a Chevy is quite another.  Even during 
World War II, the federal government did not mandate that individual 
citizens purchase war bonds. 
 
Randy E. Barnett, Is health-care reform constitutional?, WASH. POST., Mar. 21, 
2010, at B2.  Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between 
encouraging increased market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will 
certainly not be the last if it is upheld. 
c.   United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
 
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), also demonstrates that 
Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s power.  In Morrison, the Court held that a 
portion of the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy for 
victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause 
                                                                                                                                                             
and there is no way to avoid it.  Those who fall under the individual 
mandate either comply with it, or they are penalized.  It is not based 
on an activity that they make the choice to undertake.  Rather, it is 
based solely on citizenship and on being alive. 
 
State of Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *117-*118. 
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authority because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of 
the phrase, economic activity.”  Id. at 613 (emphasis added).  Congress found that 
gender-motivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce, diminishes 
national productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply of and 
demand for interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the argument “that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 617-18.  The Court 
noted that cases in which it had upheld an assertion of Commerce Clause authority 
due to the regulated activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce involved 
the regulation of “commerce,” an “economic enterprise,” “economic activity,” or 
“some sort of economic endeavor.”  Id. at 610-11.  The Court observed that the 
government’s attenuated method of reasoning was similar to the reasoning offered 
in Lopez and raised concerns that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to 
completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local 
authority.”  Id. at 615. 
 Morrison illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority for the same reasons cited above with respect to Lopez.  
Following the attenuated chain of inferences offered in support of Section 1501 
would lead to an unchecked federal police power allowing Congress to, for the first 
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time in our country’s history, mandate a host of purchases by its citizens.4/ 
d.   Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
 
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), also does not support Section 1501.  
In Raich, the Court considered “whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that 
are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.”  Id. at 9.  The Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) created a “closed regulatory system” governing the 
manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances in order to 
“conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.”  Id. at 12-13.  Under the CSA, the manufacture, 
distribution, or possession of marijuana was a criminal offense.  Id. at 14. 
 California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes 
under state law brought an as-applied challenge to the CSA.  Importantly, the 
Court emphasized that 
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part 
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was 
well within Congress’ commerce power. . . .  Nor do they contend that 
any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional 
exercise of congressional authority.  Rather, respondents’ challenge is 
actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition 
                                                 
 
4/ In ruling the individual mandate unconstitutional, Judge Hudson properly 
explained that the unchecked expansion of Congressional power as suggested by 
the individual mandate “would invite unbridled exercise of federal police powers.”  
Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *58-*59. 
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of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the 
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical 
purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under 
the Commerce Clause. 
 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as 
applied to the troubling facts of this case.”  Id. at 9.  The Court stated, “[o]ur case 
law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are 
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[w]hen 
Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55).  As 
such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, 
the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no 
consequence.’”  Id.  (citation omitted). 
 The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced 
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut 
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”  Id. at 18.  The Court 
declared that in both Wickard and the case before it, “the regulation is squarely 
within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant 
for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply 
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and demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Id. at 19.  Moreover, “the 
activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . .  The CSA is a 
statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26 
(emphasis added). 
 The Court reiterated that, “‘[w]here the class of activities is regulated and 
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, 
as trivial, individual instances of the class.’”  Id. at 23 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 
154).  Since the manufacture and distribution of marijuana was an economic class 
of activity that Congress could regulate, 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the 
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a 
gaping hole in the CSA.  Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted 
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible 
commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.” . . .  That the regulation ensnares some 
purely intrastate activity is of no moment.  As we have done many 
times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger 
scheme. 
 
Id. at 22.  The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many 
‘essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”  
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 Raich provides no support for Section 1501.  Unlike Raich, this is not an as-
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applied challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme.  Rather, Plaintiffs here 
contend that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s authority and should be declared 
unconstitutional.  (R. 1, Complaint at ¶ 6.)  Thus, Raich’s emphasis on the 
reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid statutory scheme 
due to the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local conduct is not 
implicated by this case. 
 In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to 
discourage an ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:  “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, 
and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26.  The Court repeatedly emphasized 
that the substantial effects test governs the authority of Congress to target 
“activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’”  Id. at 17 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the 
Court presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the 
reach of federal power.” Id. at 23.  By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an 
ongoing economic class of activities “within the reach of federal power.”  See id.  
Lawful presence in the United States, without more, is not an economic class of 
activities akin to the production and distribution of a marketable commodity.  
Raich does not support the idea that the targeted economic class of activities does 
not need to consist of activity but includes abstract decisions to not purchase a 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110817698   Filed: 12/15/2010   Page: 26
21 
good or service. 
 2. The district court misinterpreted Supreme Court case law 
 
 Although the district court correctly noted that the PPACA’s 
constitutionality presents a matter of first impression, (R. 28, Order at 15), the 
court’s interpretation of the above-referenced Supreme Court cases was incorrect.  
Through the PPACA, Congress is not seeking to regulate existing local economic 
activity as a necessary component of regulating that type of economic activity 
nationwide, but rather is forcing individuals who are not engaged in the economic 
activity of buying and maintaining health insurance to do so.  The district court 
erred in concluding that Wickard, Raich, or other cases support the proposition that 
Congress can—for the first time in our Nation’s history—declare that individuals 
who are not engaging in a particular economic activity must do so solely because 
other statutory provisions are attached to and connected with that mandate.  (See R. 
28, Order at 16-19.) 
 In addition, statements in Lopez and Raich concerning Congress’s ability to 
enact a regulatory scheme targeting interstate economic activity that encompasses 
some purely local economic activity have no bearing upon Section 1501.  Although 
the Court noted in Raich that the laws upheld in Wickard and Raich were essential 
parts of a regulatory scheme, Raich does not stand for the broad proposition that 
Congress has free reign to pass otherwise unconstitutional laws by including them 
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within a larger regulatory program.  Wickard and Raich held only that federal 
regulation of a particular type of economic activity—the production and 
consumption of a marketable commodity—can, in some circumstances, be applied 
to reach that type of existing economic activity at a purely local level when doing 
so is necessary and proper to the effective national regulation of that economic 
activity. 
 Lopez and Morrison establish that the power to regulate commerce is the 
power to regulate commercial or economic activity, however local or trivial in 
scope (at least so long as that local activity in the aggregate could reasonably be 
thought to substantially affect interstate commerce).  One does not engage in 
commerce by deciding not to engage in commerce.  Not even the most expansive 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases support the notion that Congress can 
regulate inactivity or coerce commercial activity where none exists.  
 If Congress can coerce a commercial transaction simply by asserting, as it 
did in the PPACA, that coercing the transaction “is commercial and economic in 
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,” PPACA § 1501(a)(1), and 
listing a series of “[e]ffects on the National Economy and Interstate Commerce,” 
id. § 1501(a)(2), as amended by § 10106(a), then the universe of commercial 
transactions that Congress could force Americans to engage in would be practically 
limitless.  Under Raich and Wickard, very little commercial activity can be 
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considered too trivial or local to elude the commerce power.  When that principle 
is coupled with the federal government’s implicit assumption in the PPACA that 
Congress can regulate commercial inactivity by coercing citizens to purchase any 
given product, there is no constitutional obstacle to the complete federal 
government micro-management of Americans’ financial decision-making. 
For example, to try to stabilize the American automobile industry, the 
United States Treasury authorized loans to bail out General Motors and Chrysler.  
Press Release, United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson Statement on 
Stabilizing the Automotive Industry (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/hp1332.htm.  Because selling more cars would help restore GM and 
Chrysler to profitability, Congress could rationally determine that requiring all 
Americans above a certain income level to purchase a new GM or Chrysler 
automobile would help ensure that the bailout’s purpose—GM’s and Chrysler’s 
survival—is achieved.  Under the district court’s reasoning, Congress would be 
acting within its commerce power.  After all, the decision whether to buy a car 
would be, by the district court’s reckoning, commercial and economic in nature, 
“viewed in the aggregate,” that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause.  
(See R. 28, Order at 16.) 
Similarly, to shore up the financial services industry, Congress could compel 
Americans to make certain investments with distressed financial firms.  Or 
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Congress could rationally determine that a lack of exercise contributes to poor 
health, which increases health care expenses and the cost of health insurance, and 
threatens Congress’s attempt to lower health care and health insurance costs.  If so, 
by the district court’s reasoning that allowed it to conclude that the individual 
mandate is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, Congress could 
require Americans to purchase health club memberships, lose weight, or open up a 
money market account.   
Take again the GM and Chrysler example.  It is at best a stretch to say that a 
person who does not own an automobile and is not seeking presently to buy an 
automobile is participating in the automobile market.  But the point of owning an 
automobile is to provide transportation, and everyone inevitably needs to get from 
one place to another.  Thus, all people are participants in the broader market for 
transportation, a market that includes the automobile market.  Deciding to forego 
buying a car and to depend instead on public transportation, taxis, or even walking 
is, by the district court’s reasoning, engaging in economic activity—that is, 
deciding which type of transportation to use or, put another way, deciding not 
whether but how to participate in the transportation market—that Congress may 
regulate because it is reasonable to conclude that the aggregate of those decisions 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110817698   Filed: 12/15/2010   Page: 30
25 
The upshot is that all private purchasing decisions (negative and affirmative) 
can be characterized under the district court’s reasoning as commercial and 
economic activity and will likely, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce.  If 
this court upholds the individual mandate to force private citizens to buy health 
insurance, the effect would be to strip any remaining limits on Congress’s power to 
control individual economic behavior.   
When President Truman likewise sought to expand federal power over a 
substantial portion of the economy by seizing American steel mills, the Supreme 
Court was keenly aware of the threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.  
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurring opinion, to provide effective 
“limitations on the power of governors over the governed,” this Nation’s founders 
rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks 
and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not 
mere theory; it was a felt necessity. . . .  These long-headed statesmen 
had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or 
sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power. . . .  
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.  It does 
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked 
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested 
assertion of authority. 
 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 The principles of federalism and a limited federal government, like the 
separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and balances essential to 
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limiting centralized governmental power and protecting liberty.  Upholding the 
individual mandate would effectively confer upon Congress “a plenary police 
power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all individual economic decisions and place 
Americans’ economic liberty at risk.  See Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, 
at *38, *58-*59. 
 In sum, the district court misconstrued Supreme Court precedent in reaching 
its conclusion that the individual mandate does not exceed Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority.  This court should reverse the final decision and judgment of the 
district court.5/  (R. 28-29.) 
B.   BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE 
FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE PPACA,  
THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID 
 
Generally, holding one provision of a law unconstitutional does not 
invalidate the rest of the law if the unconstitutional provisions are severable.  
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).  Section 1501 is not severable, 
however, so the PPACA is invalid in its entirety because Section 1501 is 
unconstitutional.  
                                                 
 
5/ The Necessary and Proper Clause does not save the individual mandate.  
That clause “grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its 
constitutionally-enumerated powers.  This authority may only be constitutionally 
deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power.”  Because 
the individual mandate is unconstitutional, the Necessary and Proper Clause “may 
not be employed to implement this affirmative duty to engage in private 
commerce.”  Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *39-*40.  
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“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into 
legislative intent.”  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172, 191 (1999).  “Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed 
provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the 
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 
684.  A court must ask “whether [after removing the invalid provision] the 
[remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.”  Id. at 685 (original emphasis omitted).  
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be 
severable:  First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of 
health care reform legislation; second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot 
function “in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” without Section 
1501.  See id.   
The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House 
approved on November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well 
as a provision that stated, “[i]f any provision of this Act, or any application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of the provisions of this Act and the application of the provision to any 
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other person or circumstance shall not be affected.”6/  H.R. 3962’s severability 
provision, however, was not included in the final version of the PPACA.  That 
Congress decided not to include a severability clause in the PPACA as enacted is 
strong evidence that Congress did not intend for the statute’s individual provisions 
to be severable. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alaska Airlines, Congress 
could not have intended the individual mandate to be severable if severing it would 
allow an inoperable or counterproductive regulatory scheme to stand.  See 480 U.S. 
at 684; accord Free Enter. Fund. v Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3161-62 (2010).  The PPACA forbids providers from refusing health 
insurance coverage to individuals because of preexisting conditions.  PPACA § 
1201.  Without the individual mandate, a person could refuse to purchase health 
insurance until he incurred an actual injury or illness requiring medical care.  
Without the individual mandate, the resulting free-riding could soon cause any 
private or co-operative insurance provider that depends on premium dollars to 
become insolvent.  The PPACA contains exchanges made up of insurance 
providers, but does not contain any plan completely administered and supported by 
                                                 
 
6/ H.R. 3962, § 255, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Bill Summary & Status, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of 
Legislation,” then the link for “Affordable Health Care for America Act 
(Engrossed in House [Passed House]-EH)”). 
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the government.  Because the envisioned insurance providers would depend upon 
premium dollars, the individual mandate is designed to bolster the providers’ 
solvency in each insurance exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory 
scheme.7/  (See R. 28, Order at 18-19.) 
Because the individual mandate is so essential to the PPACA’s overall 
operation, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that Congress could not have 
intended the individual mandate to be severable from the rest of the PPACA.  In 
fact, it is fair to say that without the individual mandate, it is highly probable there 
would be no PPACA.  These observations, along with the fact that Congress 
deleted a severability provision from an earlier version of the national health care 
reform legislation, lead inexorably to one conclusion:  the individual mandate is 
not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions.  Thus, because the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional, this court should rule the entire PPACA 
invalid.8/ 
                                                 
 
7/ This is not to say that the connection between the individual mandate and 
the rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for 
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, as argued previously in this brief. 
 
 
8/ The district court characterized the sanction imposed by the PPACA on 
those who do not obtain insurance coverage as a penalty that Congress may impose 
incidentally under the Commerce Clause rather than a tax.  (R. 28, Order at 19-20.)  
Since the sanction is a penalty, rather than a valid tax, it also exceeds Congress’s 
authority because the individual mandate itself is unconstitutional. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 This court should reverse the district court’s final decision and judgment, (R. 
28-29), and declare the PPACA unconstitutional. 
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